By: Julius Konton
Liberia’s National Legislature is facing renewed scrutiny over its effectiveness, transparency and independence after a new civil-society monitoring report identified wide disparities in lawmakers’ attendance, limited participation in legislative debates, committee bottlenecks and significant weaknesses in public-sector budget reporting.
The findings are contained in the 2025 Legislative Monitoring Report published by InfoQuest Liberia, an independent civic accountability organization, under the provocative title: “Power, People, and Plenary, Who Really Runs the Legislature?”
The report examines the performance of the Senate and House of Representatives between January and December 2025, focusing on three fundamental functions of a legislature: representation, lawmaking and oversight.
Its central assessment is deliberately stark.
InfoQuest describes a legislative institution that can be “procedurally present but substantively absent” , a characterization it bases on a combination of attendance records, debate participation, committee activity, legislative output and oversight performance.
The report does not suggest that every lawmaker performed poorly. Instead, its data reveal significant differences among legislators and point to what InfoQuest describes as broader institutional weaknesses that cannot be attributed solely to individual members.
At the heart of the controversy is a basic democratic question: Does a legislature fulfill its constitutional mandate simply by meeting and passing bills, or must lawmakers also consistently attend proceedings, debate national policy, scrutinize public expenditure and make their individual positions visible to voters?
According to InfoQuest Boss, Matthias Yeanay, the House of Representatives recorded 55 plenary sessions and 13 executive sessions during 2025, for a total of 68 recorded sittings.
The Senate recorded 60 plenary sessions during the same period.
These figures indicate considerable legislative activity on paper.
But InfoQuest argues that the number of sittings alone provides an incomplete measure of institutional performance.
Liberia’s Legislature is one of the three constitutionally established branches of government.
The country operates a bicameral system comprising the Senate and House of Representatives under the 1986 Constitution, which assigns the National Legislature broad responsibilities including lawmaking, representation, appropriation and oversight of the Executive.
That role carries particular historical significance.
Liberia’s legislative tradition stretches back to the founding of the republic in the 19th century.
The modern constitutional order, however, emerged from the 1986 Constitution following years of political upheaval and was subsequently tested by Liberia’s devastating civil wars.
The restoration of constitutional civilian government in 2006 marked a major turning point in Liberia’s democratic history.
Since then, elections, legislative institutions and peaceful transfers of political authority have become important indicators of the country’s democratic consolidation.
But democratic institutions are judged not only by whether elections are held. They are also judged by how effectively elected institutions exercise the powers entrusted to them.
That is where the InfoQuest report seeks to shift the debate.
Perhaps the report’s most politically sensitive findings concern attendance.
Mr. Yeanay said the report identified Thomas P. Fallah, P. Mike Jurry, James Kolleh, Ivar Kokulo Jones and Alex Grant among House members recorded with 100 percent attendance.
At the opposite end, the organization reported attendance levels ranging from approximately 18 percent to 27 percent for several representatives, including Roland Cooper, Manah Bishop Johnson, Taa Wongbe, Kortor Kwagrue, Josiah Cole, Musa Bility, Bintu Massaley, Edward Flomo, Yekeh Kolubah and J. Fonati Koffa.
InfoQuest identified Nyonblee Karnga Lawrence, Darius Dillon, Gbehzohngar Findley, Augustine Chea and J. Gblehbo Brown among senators with comparatively high attendance, ranging from approximately 90 percent to 93 percent.
By contrast, the report placed Saah Joseph, Simeon Taylor, Samuel Kogar, Nathaniel McGill, Alex Tyler, Crayton Duncan, Edwin Snowe and Francis Dopoh in an attendance range of approximately 41 percent to 50 percent.
The report’s most striking attendance claim concerns four senators whom InfoQuest recorded with 60 excused absences, equivalent to the full number of Senate sittings identified in its monitoring.
That finding raises an important distinction between absence and excused absence.
An excused absence is not necessarily evidence of misconduct. Parliamentary rules exist precisely because lawmakers may sometimes be unable to attend for legitimate reasons.
The deeper institutional question, however, is whether excusal procedures are being applied consistently, transparently and in a manner that protects constituents’ right to representation.
For voters, the issue is straightforward: When an elected representative is repeatedly absent, who speaks for the constituency when consequential legislation and national policies are being debated?
Attendance, however, is only one measure of parliamentary engagement.
He stressed that the report also examined participation in legislative debate and here, the report identifies another significant gap.
In the House, Thomas P. Fallah reportedly recorded the highest number of debate contributions, with 40, followed by James Kolleh with 31 and Moima Briggs Mensah with 26.
But InfoQuest identified nine representatives with no recorded debate contribution during the monitoring period.
They were listed as Abu Bana Kamara, Isaac Bannie, Bintu Massaley, Mohammed Dosii, Sam Jallah, Roland Cooper, Taa Wongbe, Zinnah Norman and Mustapha Waritay.
In the Senate, Jonathan Sogbie reportedly led with 21 contributions, while Darius Dillon, Prince Moye and Wellington Smith each recorded 19.
The report identified Gbehzohngar Findley, Crayton Duncan, Dabah Varpillah and Francis Dopoh among senators with only one recorded contribution.
The figures do not necessarily mean that lawmakers who spoke less did no legislative work.
Parliamentary influence can also occur through committee deliberations, negotiations, constituency work, amendments and other activities that may not be captured by plenary debate records.
Nevertheless, the data raise an uncomfortable question about public accountability:
If citizens cannot readily see their representatives debating the laws that govern them, how should voters evaluate legislative performance?
Legislative productivity presents another complicated picture.
InfoQuest reported that the House had 79 bills passed and 58 bills pending in committee.
The Senate, meanwhile, had 38 bills passed and 40 pending in committee.
Combined, the figures amount to 117 bills reported as passed and 98 bills pending in committee.
That means, based on the report’s figures, the number of bills still in committee was equivalent to approximately 84 percent of the number reported as passed.
The figures should not be interpreted as a direct measure of legislative failure.
Bills can remain in committee for legitimate reasons, including technical review, stakeholder consultation, constitutional considerations or the need to reconcile competing proposals.
But a large committee backlog can become problematic when bills remain there indefinitely without clear explanations, timelines or publicly accessible progress reports.
The question, therefore, is not simply how many bills passed, but also how many proposals received meaningful scrutiny, how long they remained under consideration and what happened to legislation that did not advance.
Perhaps the most politically consequential finding concerns the source of legislation.
InfoQuest reported that 42 of the 117 passed bills originated from the Executive Branch.
That represents approximately 36 percent of the bills the organization counted as passed.
InfoQuest argues that the figure deserves scrutiny because it may indicate that the Executive has substantial influence over the legislative agenda.
But this finding requires careful interpretation.
Executive-sponsored legislation is not unusual in presidential systems.
Governments frequently introduce bills needed to implement their policy agendas, administer public institutions, manage national finances or meet international obligations.
The existence of Executive-originated bills, therefore, does not by itself establish legislative weakness or constitutional overreach.
The more fundamental issue is what happens after a bill reaches the Legislature.
Are lawmakers independently examining its provisions?
Are they proposing amendments?
Are committees conducting meaningful consultations?
Are constitutional and fiscal implications being tested?
And are legislators willing to reject or substantially modify Executive proposals when they believe the national interest requires it?
Those questions go to the heart of legislative independence.
A strong Legislature does not necessarily need to reject Executive legislation. It needs to demonstrate that it has the institutional capacity and political independence to scrutinize, amend, approve or reject legislation on its merits.
The 5 Percent Budget-Reporting Problem
Perhaps the most serious institutional concern identified by InfoQuest relates to financial oversight.
According to the report, only six of 120 ministries, agencies and commissions (MACs) submitted mandatory quarterly budget-performance reports during the period assessed.
That amounts to a compliance rate of just 5 percent.
Conversely, approximately 95 percent of the institutions identified in the report did not submit the required reports.
For a Legislature whose constitutional responsibilities include approving public expenditure and overseeing the implementation of government programs, that figure carries significant implications.
Budget approval is only one side of fiscal accountability.
The other side is determining whether appropriated funds were actually spent for their intended purposes and whether government programs delivered the promised results.
Without regular performance reporting, legislators face greater difficulty determining whether public resources are being used efficiently, whether projects are progressing and whether government agencies are meeting their stated objectives.
This is where legislative oversight intersects directly with citizens’ everyday concerns, roads, schools, hospitals, electricity, water, salaries, public infrastructure and social services.
A Parliament that approves billions of dollars in public spending but lacks reliable mechanisms for tracking implementation risks becoming more of an appropriating institution than an accountability institution.
InfoQuest also raises concerns about the visibility of parliamentary proceedings.
Among the issues identified are frequent executive or closed-door sessions, limited public access to individual voting records, weak documentation of committee activities and delays in the commencement of legislative sessions.
The organization reported that House proceedings frequently began between 10:30 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., while Senate sessions sometimes began between 12:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m.
The report also criticizes the absence of an electronic voting system that would allow citizens to determine how individual legislators voted on major pieces of legislation.
This issue is particularly important in an era when parliamentary transparency increasingly depends on digital access.
Citizens should not have to rely exclusively on political speeches, press conferences or social-media statements to determine where their elected representatives stand.
A publicly accessible voting record would allow voters, journalists, researchers and civil-society organizations to compare campaign promises with actual legislative behavior.
InfoQuest also wants greater accountability for lawmakers who participate in international parliamentary engagements, including activities involving the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and other regional institutions.
The organization recommends that lawmakers returning from international parliamentary missions submit formal reports detailing the purpose of their trips, key outcomes and relevance to Liberia.
The proposal touches on a broader issue surrounding public expenditure.
International parliamentary engagements can provide lawmakers with opportunities to participate in regional diplomacy, legislative cooperation and policy development.
But when such activities are financed with public resources, taxpayers have a legitimate interest in understanding what was achieved and how the experience benefited national policy.
The principle is simple: publicly funded travel should produce publicly accountable results.
The Legislature’s Defense: Numbers Do Not Tell the Whole Story
Yet the report’s findings should not be interpreted without context.
Legislative effectiveness is difficult to capture through attendance percentages and plenary speech counts alone.
A lawmaker may participate extensively in committee meetings without making frequent speeches in plenary.
Another may play a central role in negotiations or legislative drafting that is not immediately visible in attendance records.
Similarly, an excused absence may reflect medical, family, constituency or official responsibilities rather than deliberate neglect.
And the number of bills passed cannot, by itself, determine whether legislation is good or bad.
The real test is therefore broader: What quality of laws did the Legislature produce?
How rigorous was its scrutiny?
What oversight actions did committees take?
What changes did lawmakers make to Executive proposals?
And how effectively did they represent citizens beyond the chamber?
These questions require both quantitative data and qualitative assessment.
That distinction is important if the InfoQuest report is to contribute to institutional reform rather than simply become another political scorecard.
Perhaps the most important conclusion emerging from the report is that Liberia’s legislative challenges may extend beyond individual lawmakers.
Weak committee documentation, limited public access, insufficient performance reporting and the absence of electronic voting point toward questions of institutional capacity.
A legislature cannot become more effective simply by demanding that individual lawmakers attend more sessions.
It also needs professional research capacity, adequately resourced committees, modern information systems, transparent procedures and mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of legislation.
The problem, in other words, may be as much about the institutional architecture of Parliament as about the behavior of individual legislators.
To address the weaknesses identified in its monitoring, InfoQuest is calling for a broad package of reforms.
Among its recommendations are:
Mandatory General Auditing Commission audits of the Legislature;
Strict enforcement of attendance and excusal rules;
Reintroduction of electronic voting systems;
Greater public access to committee meetings and reports;
Mandatory quarterly budget-performance reporting by MACs;
Timely publication of bills, voting records and committee outputs;
Sanctions for chronic absenteeism and persistent nonperformance;
Mandatory reports from lawmakers following international parliamentary engagements;
Strengthening the professional and technical capacity of legislative committees;
Improved enforcement of parliamentary rules and procedures; and
Measures to address gender disparities and strengthen inclusive representation.
The recommendations amount to more than a demand for individual accountability.
They represent a call for a more transparent and technologically modern Legislature.
Liberia’s democratic story is inseparable from the strength of its institutions.
After decades marked by political instability and civil conflict, the restoration of constitutional government in 2006 created an opportunity to build institutions capable of resolving political disagreements through elections, legislation and public accountability rather than violence.
The Legislature sits at the center of that project.
It approves national spending.
It makes laws.
It represents constituencies.
It scrutinizes the Executive.
It provides one of the principal institutional checks against the concentration of political power.
That is why questions about attendance, debate, legislative initiative and budget oversight are not merely procedural disputes.
They are questions about the quality of Liberia’s democracy.
Who Really Runs the Legislature?
That brings the debate back to InfoQuest’s provocative title: “Power, People, and Plenary, Who Really Runs the Legislature?”
The answer cannot simply be the President, the Speaker, the Senate Pro-Tempore or individual lawmakers.
Constitutionally, legislative authority belongs to the Legislature as an institution, while its democratic legitimacy ultimately comes from the people.
But institutions are only as strong as the rules, resources, transparency mechanisms and political culture that sustain them.
If lawmakers are absent, committees fail to act, voting records remain difficult to access and government agencies do not consistently report how public funds are being used, citizens are left with fewer tools to hold their representatives accountable.
And when Executive-sponsored legislation dominates the policy agenda without sufficient evidence of independent legislative scrutiny, questions about institutional balance inevitably follow.
That does not automatically prove Executive domination.
It does, however, make legislative independence a legitimate subject of public examination.
The real value of the InfoQuest report may ultimately depend on what happens after its publication.
Reports can expose weaknesses, but institutions change through measurable reforms.
Liberia’s Legislature now has an opportunity to respond with data of its own: attendance records, committee reports, voting histories, legislative performance indicators, oversight actions and explanations for bills that remain pending.
The Executive, too, has a role to play by ensuring that ministries and agencies comply with financial and performance-reporting requirements.
Civil society and the media must continue to scrutinize both branches without becoming substitutes for either.
And citizens must have access to the information necessary to judge their elected representatives.
The debate should therefore move beyond the question of whether InfoQuest’s characterization is too harsh.
The more important question is whether the evidence can be independently examined and whether Liberia’s institutions are prepared to correct the weaknesses that the data reveal.
InfoQuest’s 2025 monitoring report presents a Legislature that, by its own accounting, was active but uneven: 68 recorded House sittings, 60 Senate plenary sessions, 117 reported passed bills and 98 bills pending in committee, alongside major disparities in attendance and debate participation.
Its most troubling fiscal statistic is the reported 5 percent compliance rate for quarterly budget-performance reporting among 120 MACs.
Its most politically provocative finding is that 42 of the 117 passed bills roughly 36 percent originated from the Executive.
None of these figures, standing alone, proves that Liberia’s Legislature has failed.
But taken together, InfoQuest argues, they raise serious questions about whether parliamentary power is being translated into effective representation, independent scrutiny and meaningful oversight.
For Liberia, the issue is bigger than any single legislator or political party.
It is about whether a constitutional institution that emerged from a long and difficult democratic journey can evolve into a Legislature that is not merely present, but engaged; not merely productive, but effective; not merely powerful, but accountable.
The ultimate measure of parliamentary performance is not the number of people seated in the chamber.
It is whether those people use the authority entrusted to them to protect the public interest.
And that is the question now confronting Liberia’s Legislature:
When the doors of the Capitol close, who is really holding power, the politicians, the Executive, or the people?
